

## **Open Borders Negative**

# Notes

## **General Summary of the Aff**

The current US immigration system works through a complex array of visas/quotas. To come to the country you need to qualify for a visa and then be “chosen” as one of the X number of people per year admitted on that visa.

This affirmative would completely eliminate that system. Instead of having visas or quotas, there would be a “default presumption of admittance,” which means it’s assumed anyone can come to the country and stay for however long they want. The plan requires “strict scrutiny” for rejecting admission. Strict scrutiny is a legal term that comes from equal protection jurisprudence and is the *highest bar* for judging whether or not there is a compelling state interest. So the government would have to provide compelling/specific evidence that a specific person (rather than a whole country of origin) posed a security/health threat. This bar would be very difficult for the government to meet, resulting in many more people being admitted.

There are two advantages to the affirmative: morality and economy. The affirmative can read either or both. You should only read answers to the advantage that the aff read. If the aff *only* reads the morality advantage, you can read the “Economy DA” — that’s the turns to the economy advantage read as their own off-case position.

## **Brain Drain DA**

“Brain Drain” is the idea that when many people move to a particular country it does harm to the country they are leaving. Essentially, the most skilled people will leave, leaving behind a country without high skilled workers like doctors. The DA argues that that process causes big problems for the developing countries they no longer have the skilled workers they need to develop infrastructure, advance their economies so that they can grow their economy, and get people out of poverty.

If the affirmative does not read the poverty/structural violence impact in the 1AC you might want to add it to your 1NC shell.

You can also argue that the DA “turns the case” — because of brain drain, the plan actually *increases* inequality and poverty and is unethical. These turns case arguments do require you to win consequences matter for the most part, so you will still want to answer the morality advantage.

## **Answering the Morality Advantage**

The answers to the morality advantage fall in two categories:

- **Consequentialism Good** — These arguments say policy makers must weigh consequences and use utilitarianism. You would use these arguments to demonstrate that the impact to your DA matters and outweighs the case.
- **No Right to Migrate** — these are substantive answers to the specific moral claims of the 1AC, rather than abstract arguments about what moral system we should use.

## **Answering the Economy Advantage**

There are two primary defensive arguments to answer the economy advantage:

- **No Trillion Dollar Bills** — these cards indict the idea that open borders will result in dramatically improved economic conditions.
- **Mass Migration** — this argues that in order to solve billions of people would need to move/relocate and that aff studies don't adequately take this into account. This can be coupled with analytical arguments that the plan only solves for the US, not global open borders.

The negative also has an offensive argument to read on the economy advantage — the Wages Turn. The argument is that a massive flood of immigrants would increase supply of labor, thus depressing wages in the short run and hurting the economy of host nations.

Most of the evidence for this comes from George Borjas, an economist at Harvard. There is aff/neg evidence debating his models and qualifications you will want to familiarize yourself with.

## **Brain Drain Glossary**

Brain Drain — when a wealthy/developed country attracts migrants from a developing country who have skills that society could use (doctors, nurses, engineers etc)

Brain Gain — when migrants encourage developing countries to improve their educational system/there are spillover effects that benefit that country

Brain Circulation — when migrants move back and forth between home and host country, spreading their knowledge

Bottom Billion — the idea that we should evaluate things morally from the perspective of the poorest billion people/adopt policies that benefit them most

## **Overpopulation Disad Glossary**

Carrying Capacity — the number of people a country or parcel of land can sustainably provide for

Demographics — population statistics about a nation

Demographic decline — the idea that a nation can “age” - i.e. its average population can get older, which creates problems like there aren't enough workers or social security runs out of money as there are more people taking out than putting in

Limits to growth — there are natural, environmental ceilings on how much economic or population growth can occur, pushed beyond these limits the ecosystem will collapse

## **Morality Advantage Answers**

## 1NC — Morality Advantage Answers

**Morality of immigration is self-referential and ideological — don't let it drive policy.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Before concluding, let me point out that I have assiduously avoided the ethical issues surrounding the relaxation of immigration restrictions throughout the essay. I am certainly not qualified to comment on the morality of the restrictions that countries enact to restrict population flows across international borders. Although these ethical issues are often alluded to (both Collier and Ruhs offer lengthy discussions of these issues), the moral argument is often far too ideological and too steeped in an author's value system to be very convincing.

Moreover, I suspect that the axioms one postulates about the foundations of a just society are very likely to influence the ending point regarding the morality of immigration restrictions—one need look no further than the different systems of distributive justice proposed by Nozick and Rawls for evidence that assumptions drive conclusions. Abstracting from these ethical issues, there is a clear message for anyone examining the link between immigration and globalization: beware of social engineers who promise the existence of trillion-dollar bills on a mythical sidewalk at the end of the rainbow; those promises are often based on flimsy modeling and inadequate evidence. (973)

**No absolute right to mobility — even aff authors concede some limits are needed.**

**Miller 13** — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

Liberal political philosophers who write about migration usually begin from the premise that people should be allowed to choose where in the world to locate themselves unless it can be shown that allowing an unlimited right of migration would have harmful consequences that outweigh the value of freedom of choice (see, for instance, Carens, 1987; Hampton, 1995). In other words, the central value appealed to is simply freedom itself. Just as I should be free to decide who to marry, what job to take, what religion (if any) to profess, so I should be free to decide whether to live in Nigeria, or France, or the USA. Now these philosophers usually concede that in practice some limits may have to be placed on this freedom – for instance, if high rates of migration would result in social chaos or the breakdown of liberal states that

could not accommodate so many migrants without losing their liberal character. **In these instances, the exercise of free choice would become self-defeating.** But **the presumption is that people should be free** to choose where to live unless there are strong reasons for restricting their choice. **I want to challenge this presumption.** **Of course there is** always **some value in people having more options** to choose between, in this case options as to where to live, **but we usually draw a line between basic freedoms** that people should have as a matter of right **and what we might call bare freedoms** that do not warrant that kind of protection. **It would be good from my point of view if I were free to purchase an Aston Martin tomorrow, but that is not going to count as a morally significant freedom – my desire is not one that imposes any kind of obligation on others to meet it.** In order **to argue against immigration restrictions,** therefore, **liberal philosophers must do more than show** that **there is some value to people in being able to migrate,** or that they often *want* to migrate (as indeed they do, in increasing numbers). **It needs to be demonstrated that this freedom has the** kind of weight or **significance that could turn it into a right,** and that should therefore **prohibit states from pursuing immigration policies that limit freedom of movement.** (364)

**Policies must balance between competing interests – rights to move are not absolute.**

**Miller 13** — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in *Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The second issue is discrimination among migrants who are not refugees. **Currently, states do discriminate** on a variety of different grounds, effectively **selecting the migrants they want to take** in. **Can this be justified?** Well, **given that states are entitled to put a ceiling on the numbers of people they take** in, for reasons canvassed in the previous section, **they need to select somehow,** if only by lottery (as the USA began to do in 1995 for certain categories of immigrant). **So what grounds can they legitimately use?** It seems to me that **receiving states are entitled to consider the benefit they would receive from admitting a would-be migrant as well as the strength of the migrant’s own claim to move.** So it is acceptable to give precedence to people whose cultural values are closer to those of the existing population – for instance, to those who already speak the native language. This is a direct corollary of the argument in the previous section about cultural self-determination. Next in order of priority come those who possess skills and talents that are needed by the receiving community.<sup>2</sup> Their claim is weakened, as suggested earlier, by the likelihood that in taking them in, the receiving state is also depriving their country of origin of a valuable resource (medical expertise, for example). In such cases, **the greater the interest the potential host country has in admitting the would-be migrant, the more likely it is that admitting her will make life worse for those**

**she leaves behind.** So although it is reasonable for the receiving state to make decisions based on how much the immigrant can be expected to contribute economically if admitted, **this criterion should be used with caution.** What cannot be defended in any circumstances is **discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or, in most instances, religion** – religion could be a relevant criterion only where it continues to form an essential part of the public culture, as in the case of the state of Israel. **If nation-states are allowed to decide how many immigrants to admit in the first place, why can't they pick and choose** among potential immigrants on whatever grounds they like – admitting only red-haired women if that is what their current membership prefers? **I have tried to hold a balance between the interest that migrants have in entering the country they want to live in, and the interest that political communities having in determining their own character.** Although the first of these interests is not strong enough to justify a right of migration, it is still substantial, and so the immigrants who are refused entry are owed an explanation. To be told that they belong to the wrong race, or sex (or have hair of the wrong color) is insulting, given that these features do not connect to anything of real significance to the society they want to join. Even tennis clubs are not entitled to discriminate among applicants on grounds such as these. (372-373)

### **Preventing extinction comes first — all moral views agree.**

**Plummer 15** — Theron Plummer, researcher in philosophy at St. Anne's College at the University of Oxford, Ph.D., 2015 ("Moral Agreement on Saving the World," Practical Ethics, May 18th, Available Online at <http://blog.practicaethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe **there is** at least **one thing it is reasonable to agree on** right now, **whatever** general **moral view we adopt**: that **it is** very **important to reduce the risk that** all intelligent **beings** on this planet **are eliminated by** an enormous **catastrophe**, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that **we — whether we're consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists — should all agree that we should try to save the world.**

According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. **There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world**, even if the well-being of these possible people were

given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. **Even on a wholly person-affecting view** – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – **the case for reducing existential risk is very strong**. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. **You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations** (the goodness of outcomes), **it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake.** **Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than** the goodness of **consequences** or outcomes; **it is not the view that the latter don’t matter.** Even John **Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account** in judging rightness. **One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”** **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view.** **They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk**, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism**, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, **might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that **most of what makes our lives go well would be**

**undermined if there were no future generations** of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. **So obviously** if Scheffler were right **I'd have very strong reason to reduce existential risk.** **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** **What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain** not (only) **about** the empirical facts, but also about the **moral facts?** I've just argued that there's agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even **those** (hedonistic egoists) **who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken,** and that one of the above views is correct. **Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.** Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters,** it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, **reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely **for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future** – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). **Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives.** It's possible they'll be miserable. **It is enough** for my claim **that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.** While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won't get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And **even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to.** I suspect that **most of us alive today** – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – **have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.** Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: "We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.... Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly." (From chapter 36 of *On What Matters*)

**Must consider consequences — intent-based frameworks crush our ability to respond to violence.**

**McCluskey 15** — Martha McCluskey, JSD @ Columbia, Professor of Law @ SUNY-Buffalo, 2015 ("How the "Unintended Consequences" Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact," Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, Vol. 22, 2015, Available Online at doi: dx.doi.org/doi:10.15779/Z381664, Accessed 08-09-2018)

**By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law reform, the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm. Justice is centrally a question of whose interests and whose harms should count, in what context and in what form and to whom. Power is centrally about being able to act without having to take harm to others into account. This power to gain by harming others is strongest when it operates through systems and structures that make disregarding that harm appear routine, rational, and beneficial or at least acceptable or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures with unquestionable "main effects," the "unintended consequences" story helps affirm the resulting harm** even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others. **The unequal effects of the prevailing policy response to the crisis are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising.** It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely

inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover, **justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects**. But **the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that the best way to care for those at the bottom is to not care to make law more attentive** to the bottom. **"Unintended consequences" arguments promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual critique**—the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, **like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore their harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care about this harm**, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more deserving.<sup>169</sup> **Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and justice ahead of service to financial elites should reject stories of "unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial.**

### **Public officials must consider consequences — even if there's uncertainty.**

**Gooden 95** — Robert Gooden, philosopher at the Research School of the Social Sciences, 1995 (Utilitarianism as Public Philosophy, ISBN-13: 978-0521468060, p.62-63)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. **All choices—public and private alike—are made under some degree of uncertainty**, of course. **But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances** and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have on them. **Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices.** But that is all. **That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus**—if they want to use it at all—**to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rules.**

### **Policy predictions are possible and useful.**

**Mearsheimer 1** — John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, 2001 (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, Available Online via googleprint, p.8)

As a result, **all political forecasting is bound to include some error**. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. **Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future**. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, **making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly**. Furthermore, **trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence** (because it is not yet available). In short, **the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics**. In that spirit I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

## Disad Turns Case

**DA turns the case — any negative impact creates xenophobic backlash.**

**Johnson 9** — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 2)

At the same time, however, **the United States has an immigration dark side. A mean-spirited, anti-immigrant impulse has sporadically gripped the nation, particularly during times of social stress. During these times, the U.S. immigration laws have been harsh, discriminatory, and aggressively enforced.** Consequently, U.S. law has barred many innocent groups of people from its shores for the very worst of reasons. The near-complete prohibition of immigration from China, which lasted from the late nineteenth century until 1965, is perhaps the most famous example. **The measures taken by the federal government against Arab and Muslim noncitizens—and generally against all noncitizens—after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, are the most recent.**

**DA turns the case — immigration policies with negative impacts create hostile crackdowns on immigrants.**

**Johnson 9** — Kevin R. Johnson, Professor of Public Interest Law at UC Davis School of Law, JD from Harvard, BA in Economics from UC Berkeley, 2009 (Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Laws, 2009, ISBN-13: 978-0814743096, p. 45)

**U.S. immigration law is famous for its cyclical, turbulent, and ambivalent nature.** At times, the nation has embraced some of the most liberal immigration admissions laws and policies in the world. The nation's immigration laws, in these times, have been truer to the ideal of offering open arms to the "huddled masses" than they are today. Despite the law's current restrictions on immigration, U.S. law remains more open in terms of admissions and access to citizenship than the laws of many developed nations. **At other times in U.S. history, however, the nation has capitulated to the nativist impulse and embraced immigration laws and policies that, in retrospect, make us cringe with shame and regret. Time and time again, fear and social stress have sparked fiery attacks on the nation's most vulnerable outsiders.** Punitive immigration laws and tough enforcement, as well as harsh treatment of immigrants and minorities who shared similar characteristics in the United States, followed. **The cyclical nature of immigration politics—and thus immigration law and policy—often has been directly linked to the overall state of the U.S. economy and the perceived social evils of the day.** A wide divergence in popular opinion about immigration and immigrants has contributed to the wild fluctuations in U.S. policy. **War, political and economic turmoil, and other tensions affect the nation's collective attitude toward immigration. Social stresses, like terrorism in modern times, find a ready and unimpeded outlet in immigration law and its enforcement.** Immigration law, unlike

the vicissitudes of the economy or the whims of terrorists, can be controlled (even if enforcement might not work). (45)

## Extend: “No Absolute Right to Mobility”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — No Absolute Right to Mobility. Mobility is an *interest*, not a *basic right*. Even the aff concedes that not every person should be allowed to immigrate — that proves that it’s not an inviolable right. That’s Miller.

They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

**Movement rights aren’t absolute — must prove another right is being violated in current country.**

**Miller 13** — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in *Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The idea of a right to **freedom of movement is not in itself objectionable**. We are talking here about what are usually called basic rights or human rights, and I shall assume (since there is no space to defend the point) that such rights are justified by pointing to the vital interests that they protect (Griffin, 2001; Nickel, 1987; Shue, 1980). They correspond to conditions in whose absence human beings cannot live decent lives, no matter what particular values and plans of life they choose to pursue. Being able to move freely in physical space is just such a condition, as we can see by thinking about people whose legs are shackled or who are confined in small spaces. A wider freedom of movement can also be justified by thinking about the interests that it serves instrumentally: if I cannot move about over a fairly wide area, it may be impossible for me to find a job, to practice my religion, or to find a suitable marriage partner. Since these all qualify as vital interests, **it is fairly clear that freedom of movement qualifies as a basic human right. What is less clear**, however, **is the physical extent of that right**, in the sense of **how much of the earth’s surface I must be able to move to in order to say that I enjoy it. Even in liberal societies** that make no attempt to confine people within particular geographical areas, **freedom of movement is severely restricted in a number of ways. I cannot**, in general, **move to places that other people’s bodies now occupy** (I cannot just push them aside). **I cannot move on to private property** without the consent of its owner, except perhaps in emergencies or where a special right of access exists – and since most land is privately owned, this means that a large proportion of physical space does not fall within the ambit of a *right to free movement*. **Even access to public space is heavily regulated**: there are **traffic laws** that tell me where and at what speed I may drive my car, **parks have opening and closing hours**, the **police can control my movements** up and down the streets, and so forth. **These** are very **familiar**

observations, but they are worth making simply to highlight how hedged about with qualifications the existing right of free movement in liberal societies actually is. Yet few would argue that because of these limitations, people in these societies are deprived of one of their human rights. Some liberals might argue in favor of expanding the right – for instance, in Britain there has been a protracted campaign to establish a legal right to roam on uncultivated privately owned land such as moors and fells, a right that will finally become effective by 2005. But even the advocates of such a right would be hard-pressed to show that some vital interest was being injured by the more restrictive property laws that have existed up to now. The point here is that liberal societies in general offer their members sufficient freedom of movement to protect the interests that the human right to free movement is intended to protect, even though the extent of free movement is very far from absolute. So how could one attempt to show that the right in question must include the right to move to some other country and settle there? What vital interest requires the right to be interpreted in such an extensive way? Contingently, of course, it may be true that moving to another country is the only way for an individual to escape persecution, to find work, to obtain necessary medical care, and so forth. In these circumstances the person concerned may have the right to move, not to any state that she chooses, but to *some* state where these interests can be protected. But here the right to move serves only as a remedial right: its existence depends on the fact that the person's vital interests cannot be secured in the country where she currently resides. In a world of decent states – states that were able to secure their citizens' basic rights to security, food, work, medical care, and so forth – the right to move across borders could not be justified in this way. (365)

**Internal mobility adequately protects right to movement — no justification for open borders.**

**Miller 13** — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in *Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

Our present world is not, of course, a world of decent states, and this gives rise to the issue of refugees, which I shall discuss in the final section of this chapter. But if we leave aside for the moment cases where the right to move freely across borders depends upon the right to avoid persecution, starvation, or other threats to basic interests, how might we try to give it a more general rationale? One reason a person may want to migrate is in order to participate in a culture that does not exist in his native land – for instance he wants to work at an occupation for which there is no demand at home, or to join a religious community which, again, is not represented in the country from which he comes. These might be central components in his plan of life, so he will find it very frustrating if he is not able to move. But does this ground a right to free movement across borders? It seems to me that it does not. What a person can

legitimately demand access to is an **adequate range of options** to choose between – a reasonable choice of occupation, religion, cultural activities, marriage partners, and so forth. **Adequacy here is defined in terms of generic human interests rather than in terms of the interests of any one person in particular** – so, for example, **a would-be opera singer living in a society which provides for various forms of musical expression, but not for opera, can have an adequate range of options in this area even though the option she most prefers is not available. So long as they adhere to the standards of decency sketched above, all contemporary states are able to provide such an adequate range internally.** **So although people certainly have an interest in being able to migrate internationally, they do not have a basic interest of the kind that would be required to ground a human right. It is more like my interest in having an Aston Martin than my interest in having access to some means of physical mobility.** (366)

## Extend: “Must Balance Competing Interests”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Must Balance Competing Interests. A real commitment to justice requires evaluating not only the interests of the immigrant, but also everyone else. That’s Miller.

**They say:**

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

**A “right to exit” doesn’t demand open borders — must balance competing interests.**

**Miller 13** — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

The right of exit is certainly an important human right, but once again it is worth examining why it has the significance that it does. Its importance is partly instrumental: knowing that their subjects have the right to leave inhibits states from mistreating them in various ways, so it helps to preserve the conditions of what I earlier called “decency.” However, even in the case of decent states the right of exit remains important, and that is because by being deprived of exit rights individuals are forced to remain in association with others whom they may find deeply uncongenial – think of the militant atheist in a society where almost everyone devoutly practices the same religion, or the religious puritan in a society where most people behave like libertines. On the other hand, the right of exit from state A does not appear to entail an unrestricted right to enter any society of the immigrant’s choice – indeed, it seems that it can be exercised provided that at least one other society, society B say, is willing to take him in. It might seem that we can generate a general right to migrate by iteration: the person who leaves A for B then has the right to exit from B, which entails that C, at least, must grant him the right to enter, and so forth. But this move fails, because our person’s right of exit from A depended on the claim that he might find continued association with the other citizens of A intolerable, and he cannot plausibly continue making the same claim in the case of each society that is willing to take him in. Given the political and cultural diversity of societies in the real world, it is simply unconvincing to argue that only an unlimited choice of which one to join will prevent people being forced into associations that are repugnant to them. It is also important to stress that there are many rights whose exercise is contingent on finding partners who are willing to cooperate in the exercise, and it may be that the right of exit falls into this category. Take the right to marry as an example. This is a right held against the state to allow people to marry the partners of their choice (and perhaps to provide the legal

framework within which marriages can be contracted). It **is obviously not a right to have a marriage partner provided** – whether any given person can exercise the right depends entirely on whether he is able to find someone willing to marry him, and many people are not so lucky. **The right of exit** is a right held against a person's current state of residence not to prevent her from leaving the state (and perhaps aiding her in that endeavor by, say, providing a passport). But it **does not entail an obligation on any other state to let that person** in. Obviously, **if no state were ever to grant entry rights to people who were not already its citizens, the right of exit would have no value. But suppose** states are generally willing to consider entry applications from people who want to migrate, and that **most people would get offers from at least one such state: then the position** as far as the right of exit goes **is pretty much the same as with the right to marry, where by no means everyone is able to wed the partner they would ideally like to have, but most have the opportunity to marry someone.** (366-367)

## Extend: “Extinction First”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_\_ — Extinction First. Every moral framework must first be interested in preventing extinction because all human values are also extinguished if we eliminate the species. That means you should err negative on all of our disads — even a 1% risk of human extinction outweighs. That’s Plummer.

**They say:**

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

**The risk of extinction justifies moral loopholes.**

**Bok 88** — Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, 1988 (“The World Should Perish,” in Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and Fudlou Shehadi, ISBN-13: 978-0874802894)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

**The possibility of extinction demands epistemic modesty.**

**Schell 82** — Jonathan Schelle, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, 1982 (The Fate of the Earth, ISBN-13: 978-0224020640)

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so

many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

### **Horrendous consequences justify escape clauses in absolute morality.**

**Anscombe 93** — G.E.M. Anscombe, Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University, 1993 (“War and Murder,” in *Absolutism and Its Consequentialist Critics*, ed. Joram Graf Haber, 1993, ISBN-13: 978-0847678402, p. 58-59)

Whenever a defender of traditional morality protests that there are moral rules which, whatever the consequences, must not be broken, such as the rule prohibiting murder- the killing of the materially innocent-a natural reaction is to confront him with imaginary horror upon imaginary horror, and to inquire whether it would not be permissible, nay right, to commit murder if these horrors would be the consequences of his not committing it. And so it has come to seem natural to accept as much of utilitarianism as this: that **no moral system can be philosophically acceptable unless it is supplemented by an escape clause, to the effect that, in all cases of a choice of evils, if one of those evils is so great that incurring it rather than any of the others would be calamitous**, and if it can only be avoided by taking a certain action, **then** that **action is to be taken even if it is in breach of a precept of the system.**

## Extend: “Policymakers Must Consider Consequences”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Policymakers Must Consider Consequences. Policymakers have an obligation to consider *every person*, not just *specific groups*. And, even if their info isn’t *perfect*, it’s good enough to prevent catastrophe. That’s Gooden.

They say:

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

### **The public nature of policy-making necessitates consequentialism.**

**Brock 93** — Dan W. Brock, American philosopher, bioethicist, Professor Emeritus of Medical Ethics in the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School, the former Director of the Division of Medical Ethics (now the Center for Bioethics) at the Harvard Medical School, and former Director of the Harvard University Program in Ethics and Health (PEH), held the Tillinghast Professorship at Brown University and served as a member of the Department of Clinical Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health, B.A. in economics from Cornell and Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University, 1993 (“The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making,” in *Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, Jan 29<sup>th</sup>, p. 409-410. )

The central point of conflict is that **the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences—they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions—whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people.** The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact **that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people’s lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the**

**policy consequences** of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the policy domain? What are they doing there?

**Policymakers have to be held to different standards because of their responsibility to everyone — the aff's moral framework is itself immoral.**

**Nye 86** — Joseph Nye, professor of security affairs at Harvard, 1986 (Nuclear Ethics, ISBN-13: 978-0029230916, p. 33-4)

While the cosmopolitan approach has the virtue of accepting transnational realities and avoids the sanctification of the nation-state, an unsophisticated cosmopolitanism also has serious drawbacks. First, **if morality is about choice, then to underestimate the significance of states and boundaries is to fail to take into account the main features of the real setting in which choices must be made. To pursue individual justice at the cost of survival or to launch human rights crusades that cannot hope to be fulfilled, yet interfere with prudential concerns about order, may lead to immoral consequences.** And **if such actions**, for example the promotion of human rights in Eastern Europe, **were to lead to crises and an unintended nuclear war, the consequences might be the ultimate immorality.** **Applying ethics to foreign policy is more than merely constructing philosophical arguments; it must be relevant to the international domain in which moral choice is to be exercised.**

## They Say: “Restriction Arguments = Racist”

**Not all pro-restriction arguments are racist. Casting them as such drives debates underground.**

**Miller 13** — David Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, Fellow at Nuffield College, former Professor at the University of Lancaster, trained in philosophy at Cambridge and Oxford, 2013 (“The Case for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2013, ISBN-10: 1118479394)

**It is not easy to write about immigration from a philosophical perspective** – not easy at least **if you are writing in a society** (and this now includes most societies in the Western world) **in which immigration has become a highly charged political issue. Those who speak freely and openly about the issue tend to come from the far Right:** they are **fascists or racists who believe that it is wrong in principle** for their political community to admit immigrants who do not conform to the approved cultural or racial stereotype. **Most liberal, conservative, and social democratic politicians support quite strict immigration controls in practice, but they generally refrain from spelling out the justification** for such controls, **preferring instead to highlight the practical difficulties** involved in resettling immigrants, **and raising the spectre of a right-wing backlash** if too many immigrants are admitted. **Why are they so reticent? One reason is that it is not easy to set out the arguments for limiting immigration without at the same time projecting a negative image of those immigrants who have already been admitted, thereby playing directly into the hands of the far Right ideologues who would like to see such immigrants deprived of their full rights of citizenship** and/or repatriated to their countries of origin. **Is it possible both to argue that every member of the political community, native or immigrant, must be treated as a full citizen, enjoying equal status and the equal respect of his or her fellows, and to argue that there are good grounds for setting upper bounds both to the rate and the overall numbers of immigrants who are admitted? Yes, it is, but it requires dexterity, and always carries with it the risk of being misunderstood.** (363)

**Opposition to open borders can't be pigeonholed ideologically. This is their 1AC author.**

**Kukathas 14** — Chandran Kulathas, Chair in Political Theory and head of the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, DPhil in Politics from Oxford University, MA in Politics at the University of New South Wales, BA in History and PoliSci at Australian National University, 2014 (“The Case for Open Immigration,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 2nd Edition, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman, 2014, ISBN-10: 1118479394, p. 387-376)

People favor or are opposed to immigration for a variety of reasons. It is therefore difficult to tie views about immigration to ideological positions. While it seems obvious that political conservatives are the most unlikely to defend freedom of movement, and that socialists and liberals (classical and modern) are very likely to favor more open borders, in reality wariness (if not outright hostility) to immigration can be found among all groups. Even libertarian anarchists have advanced reasons to restrict the movement of peoples. (207)

## **Economy Advantage Answers**

[Read this version if they read the Economy Advantage in the 1AC. If they did not, read the Economy DA below this section.]

## **1NC — Economy Advantage Answers**

**Open borders cause labor saturation, inequality and wage collapse.**

**Ormerod 15** — Paul Ormerod, economist, director of Volterra Consulting, MA in Philosophy from Oxford, 2015 (“Open borders or fair wages: the left needs to make up its mind,” The Guardian, March 24th, Available Online at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/24/open-borders-fair-wages-left-mass-immigration-britain-economy>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

**Mass immigration increases inequality. This is the unpalatable fact the liberal left in Britain refuses to accept. Markets are imperfect instruments. But it is not necessary to subscribe to free market economic theory to believe that large increases in supply tend to drive down the price. And the price of labour is the wage.** Last Friday, the Guardian front page carried a report from the Office for Budget Responsibility, claiming that higher net immigration increased the UK’s economic growth rate. According to the mainstream theory of economic growth, this is undoubtedly true. Higher growth can be created by sustained increases of either capital or labour. But underlying the theory is the assumption that supply and demand balance in these markets, that the prices of the inputs are set at levels such that all available capital or labour is in fact employed and does not remain idle. So this “flourishing modern economy” with high immigration celebrated by the Guardian is based on persistent large wage inequalities. **A powerful force in the global economy is driving the increase in inequality** that has been seen in western economies over the past few decades. In essence, **there has been a massive increase in the effective supply of labour**. Over the past three decades or so, China and India have gradually been absorbed into the network of international trade. This puts pressure on European labour markets. Many call centres, for example, have been relocated to India. But much of the impact of this is indirect, operating via trade flows, and is only really felt by certain sectors of western economies. Closer to home, the opening up of eastern Europe in the early 1990s has had a strong effect, especially on countries that are their immediate neighbours, such as Germany. Employers soon realised that economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic possessed educated labour forces, whose productivity potential had been suppressed by the gross inefficiencies inherent in planned economies. German companies opened up new production plants in the old Soviet bloc countries in Europe, rather than at home. The impact on wage rates of this increase in competition was dramatic. Christian Dustmann at University College London has provided clear evidence on the evolution of wage rates in the former West Germany. The 15th percentile of the wage distribution is the level at which only 15% of wages are lower. In West Germany, at the 15th percentile, real wages have fallen almost continuously since the mid-1990s. At the 50th percentile, where half get more and half get less, the reduction has been less sharp. But the fall had set in by the early 2000s. At the 85th percentile, the mirror image of the 15th, real wages grew strongly, reaping the benefits of the recovery of the economy created by the increase in competitiveness. It is against this background that New Labour opened up Britain’s borders in the late 1990s. It was a major betrayal of the very people

the party purported to represent. In addition to the global competition from countries such as China, in addition to competition closer to home from the economies of eastern Europe, New Labour allowed direct competition to enter the UK labour market on a scale unprecedented in our history. Not surprisingly, the distribution of wage rates has evolved in very similar ways to those of West Germany. It is the relatively unskilled in the bottom half of the distribution who have lost out. The liberal elite do not suffer. Indeed, they benefit because many of the services they consume are provided at lower prices than would have been the case without mass immigration. It is sometimes argued that immigrants do jobs that native British workers are unwilling to take. Very well then, **without mass immigration, employers would be obliged to raise the real wage rate to induce these people to take the jobs.**

### **Open borders collapse wages — it's basic economics.**

**Eskow 16** — Richard Eskow, Senior Fellow at Campaign for America's Future, Senior Advisor for Health & Economic Justice at Social Security Works, 2016 (““Open Borders”: A Gimmick, Not a Solution,” Huffington Post, Available Online at [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/open-borders-a-gimmick-no\\_b\\_7945140.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/open-borders-a-gimmick-no_b_7945140.html), Accessed 08-09-2018)

**The work of economist Ha-Joon Chang, by contrast, provides compelling evidence that an open borders policy would exert a powerful downward pull on American workers' wages.**

Devaluing Other Countries Bier then **gets to the core of the open-borders argument, writing that “labor is enormously more productive here. As a result, identical workers can earn 280 percent more here than in Mexico; workers from Yemen and Nigeria, 1,300 percent more; Haitians, 2,200 percent more.”** It is inhumane, he suggests, to deny workers the opportunity to multiply their earnings by such impressive percentages. But that interpretation is, to borrow a phrase, “silly, tribal and economically illiterate.” Bier **fails to consider a fundamental principle of economics: when the supply of labor increases, wages go down. A massive influx of foreign workers would lead to a steep plunge in those multiples.** What's more, there are often significant cost-of-living differences between the United States and these workers' countries of origin. And this argument is “tribal” because advocates like Bier (and Klein) apparently don't understand that other nations, despite their relative poverty, have virtues of their own. That should be a source of deep embarrassment for them. For most migrants, their native lands hold ties of language, culture, family and community. It should not be necessary to endure the pain of displacement merely to earn a livable wage. To claim otherwise, as open-borders advocates implicitly do, is to reflect the xenophobic belief that everybody would be happier here than anywhere else.

**Aff economic models are flawed — they aren't real world and are anecdotes, not data.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

As noted above, the **huge global gains** typically found in these types of **numerical simulations** **have led a number of economists to emphasize** that the “**gains from globalization**” resulting from the decades-long effort to ease trade restrictions pale in comparison to the gains that are there for the taking if countries simply removed all existing restrictions on international migration. **Clemens** (2011), for example, **employs the metaphor that there are trillion-dollar bills lying on the sidewalk**, ready to be easily picked up, if only policymakers in the industrialized world would wisen up and remove all immigration restrictions. **Things that sound too good to be true, however, usually are.** It is not surprising then that **the analysis of both Collier and Ruhs can be interpreted as raising central questions about the model** that predicts the presence of these trillion-dollar bills on the sidewalk, **as well as providing insights for understanding why nobody ever bothers to pick them up.** The problem is easy to summarize: **those bills are probably fake.** In particular, **the simulation** reported in table 1 **is a short-run, partial-equilibrium exercise, and its implications may have little in common with what would happen in a general equilibrium setting.** Collier’s **Exodus**, in an important sense, **marks a pivoting point in the literature by taking the long-run consequences of migration flows much more seriously** than one sees in the stereotypical study. Throughout the book, Collier emphasizes how the short-run impacts of immigration can differ from what would be observed if the migration flow were to continue indefinitely: “Contrary to the prejudices of xenophobes, the evidence does not suggest that migration to date has had significantly adverse effects. . . . Contrary to self-perceived ‘progressives,’ the evidence does suggest that without effective controls migration would rapidly accelerate to the point at which additional migration would have adverse effects” (p. 245). **Unfortunately, we know little** (read: **nothing**) **about how host societies would adapt to the entry of perhaps billions of new persons**, so that there is much hand-wringing in Collier’s discussion of social costs, and the narrative depends far too much on references to “mutual regard,” “trust,” “moral outrage,” and other equally hard-to-measure concepts. **I personally find it difficult to place much faith on the robustness of Collier’s reported evidence when the heading of a key empirical section in the chapter on social consequences is titled “Some Illustrative Anecdotes”** (p. 78), and focuses mainly on the experiences of the Afro-Caribbean community in London. I have heard that the plural of anecdote is data, but Collier’s specific anecdotes do not a data set make. **As interesting as the experiences of this particular immigrant community may be, I doubt they provide much**

information about what would happen if immigration restrictions were removed and billions of persons moved to the industrialized countries. (966-7)

**Solvency requires *BILLIONS* of people to move.**

**Borjas 14** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2014 (Immigration Economics, ISBN-13: 978-0674049772)

It is **not surprising** that **a greater fraction of the South's workforce needs to move as the initial wage disparity** between the North and the South **rises. What is surprising and tends to be underemphasized** (and sometimes unmentioned) **is that even the lower-bound estimates of the wage ratio  $R$  trigger the movement of billions of people.**<sup>18</sup> This result reflects the simple fact that **the North's labor demand curve**, for what ever reason, **lies far above that of the South.** Absent the transferability of the conditions that make a specific worker much more productive in the North, **a sufficiently high wage gap essentially implies that some places in the world are so inefficient at production that their equilibrium outcome is to be "economically empty" in a world with free mobility.**<sup>19</sup> (166-7)

**Aff claims are inflated and ignore migration costs — there are no trillion dollar bills.**

**Borjas 14** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2014 (Immigration Economics, ISBN-13: 978-0674049772)

As in the original Hamilton- Whalley (1984) study, the exercise reveals that the **gains to world income are huge.** If  $R= 2$ , for example, world GDP would rise by \$9.4 trillion, a 13.4 percent increase over the initial value of \$70 trillion. If  $R= 4$ , world GDP would increase by \$40 trillion, almost a 60 percent increase. In fact, if  $R$  were to equal 6, which may be near the upper bound of the range of plausibility suggested by the available data, world **GDP would rise by \$62 trillion**, a near doubling! Note, moreover, that these gains would be accrued each year after the migration occurs, so that the present value of the gains would be astronomically high.<sup>20</sup> Of course, **these huge gains are associated with a substantial redistribution of wealth, and the LN native workers in the North are at the losing end of the deal.** As Figure 7.2 shows, the influx of  $M$  workers reduces the North's wage from  $w_N$  to  $w^*$ . The implied percent wage change is given by:

[math omitted]

Row 5 of Table 7.3 reports the wage change predicted by equation (7.24). **Regardless of the value of  $R$ , the earnings of the North's native workforce drop by 30 to 40 percent.** The huge global gains typically found in these types of numerical calibrations have led a number of economists to emphasize that the "gains from globalization" resulting from the decades-long effort to ease trade restrictions pale in comparison to the gains that are there for the taking if countries simply removed all existing restrictions on international migration.<sup>21</sup> Even **putting aside the political difficulties in enacting such a policy, this argument in favor of unrestricted international migration glosses over two conceptual obstacles.** First, **the calculation assumes that people can somehow start at a specific latitude-longitude coordinate and end up at a different coordinate at zero cost.** Unfortunately, **even the seemingly simple transporter used by Starship Enterprise** personnel, which is able to instantaneously move people across vast distances, **is not costless.** The **absence of legal restrictions** prohibiting the movement of people from one country to another **does not circumvent the fact that it would be very costly to move billions of workers.** As noted in Chapter 1, **large wage differences across regions can persist for a very long time simply because many people choose not to move.** In a world of income-maximizing agents, the stayers are signaling that **there are substantial psychic costs to mobility, perhaps even on the order of hundreds of thousands dollars per person, and that they are willing to leave substantial wage gains on the table.** Kennan and Walker (2011 p. 232), for instance, estimate that it costs \$312,000 to move the average person from one state to another within the United States.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, **Artuc et al. (2010) report that average moving costs are nearly 8 times the annual salary for workers who move from one industry to another** as they try to escape the adverse consequences of industry-specific trade shocks. Although these costs seem implausibly high, moving costs must be around that order of magnitude to be consistent with the observed fact that people do not move as much as they should given the existing regional wage differences. **If moving costs were indeed in that range, it is easy to show that the huge global gains from migration become substantially smaller and may even vanish after taking moving costs into account.** Suppose, for instance, that  $R = 4$ , so that the global gain is around \$40 trillion annually when 2.6 billion workers move from the South to the North. Assuming a 5 percent rate of discount, the present value of these gains is \$800 trillion! The 2.6 billion worker-migrants will, more likely than not, bring their families, so the actual number of people moving would be around 5.6 billion (or the 95 percent migration rate times the South's population of 5.9 billion people). The "breakeven" cost of migration given in the last row of Table 7.3 is around \$140,000. In short, **the entire present value of the global gains is wiped out even if the costs of migration were only half of what is typically reported in existing studies.**<sup>23</sup> Needless to say, the magnitudes involved in this numerical exercise are mindboggling and should be taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt. But they do teach us an important lesson: **the global gains from "free migration" need to be contrasted with the costs of moving billions of people, many of whom do not wish to move, if the exercise is to be taken seriously** (167-8)

## **Mass migration weakens institutions that promoted growth in the first place.**

**Borjas 14** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2014 (Immigration Economics, ISBN-13: 978-0674049772)

It is also important to emphasize that the **gains** reported in Table 7.3 **depend crucially on the assumption that the intercepts of the labor demand curves in the North and South are fixed. However, the North's demand curve lies above the South's demand curve**, not simply because that is just the way things are, but **because of very specific political, economic, institutional, and cultural factors that endogenously led to the development of different infrastructures** in the two regions, with the Northern infrastructure allowing similarly skilled workers to attain a higher value of marginal product. As the important work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) suggests, **"nations fail" mainly because of differences in political and economic institutions. For immigration to generate substantial global gains, it must be the case that billions of immigrants can move to the industrialized economies without importing the "bad" institutions that led to poor economic conditions in the source countries** in the first place. **It seems inconceivable that the North's infrastructure would remain unchanged** after the admission of billions of new workers. Unfortunately, remarkably little is known about the political and cultural impact of immigration on the receiving countries, and about how institutions in these receiving countries would adjust to the influx. **In a general equilibrium framework, it seems reasonable to imagine that the integration of the two regions could easily result in the dilution of whatever unique set of circumstances allowed the North to enjoy such a large productive advantage.**<sup>24</sup> A "modest" relaxation of immigration restrictions— say, one that only allows 10 percent of the optimal number of immigrants into the developed countries— would still imply migration flows of more than half a billion people, including the related family members, when  $R = 4$ . This limited migration flow would still be almost three times as large as the number of international migrants that now exist. The magnitude of even these limited flows would likely lead to different results in partial and general equilibrium calibrations: **As the North adapts to its new political and demographic reality, the gains implied by the partial equilibrium simulation may begin to dissipate.** (168-9)

## **Successful growth requires integration.**

**Swanson 16** — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 ("Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest," Washington Post, October 14<sup>th</sup>, Available Online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and->

politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.3644dc63446d, Accessed 08-08-2018)

"They actually financially saved the social security system, or at least deferred for five or 10 years the time of reckoning. Because young people pay taxes, but they don't get sick, and they don't use retirement funds," he said. **Borjas**, the **Harvard professor**, **has argued**, however, that **unrestricted immigration can place a fiscal burden on a state, and that the gains from immigration depend largely on whether receiving countries build enough infrastructure to accommodate them. Immigrants aren't just perfect cogs in the machine of the economy, he says -- they are real people, and their presence raises real questions about how they and their descendants fit into a society.**

## Extend: “Collapses Wages/Increases Inequality”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — **Open Borders Collapse Wages and Increase Inequality.** Increasing the supply of labor drives down the price of that labor — the wages of workers. That’s devastating for the least well off in society. This turns their impacts because the plan increases poverty and inequality. That’s Ormerod and Eskow.

**They say:**

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

### **Open borders increase inequality.**

**Swanson 16** — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14<sup>th</sup>, Available Online at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.3644dc63446d](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d), Accessed 08-08-2018)

**Not all economists agree** with these arguments. **Harvard economist** George **Borjas**, for example, **has made the case that more immigration into developed countries would produce large gains for some groups, such as wealthy executives and investors, but that native workers would lose out.** **"In the end, immigration will almost certainly improve the economic well-being of some Americans, but other Americans will be worse off,"** he has written.

### **Open borders don’t reduce inequality — the gains go to already-rich capitalists.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

There is **one final redistributive impact** that is worth documenting. Specifically, **the income accruing to capitalists will also change.** Define the gains to “global capitalists” as the excess income produced that is not paid directly to workers. The increased returns to capital are given by: (8)  $\Delta \text{Income of Capitalists} = [Y1 - w * (LN + LS)] - [Y0 - wN LN - wS LS]$ . As row 7 of table 1 shows, **there will be a substantial increase in the wealth of global capitalists, amounting to**

about \$12 trillion, or a 57 percent increase over their initial income. In short, a world integrated by unrestricted migration flows creates large gains for some groups, but also creates large losses for a group of workers who will vociferously fight the policy shift. It is the existence of this losing group of workers that often leads to a degeneration of the immigration debate into a collection of slurs and facile accusations of racism. Collier's narrative, unfortunately, is not immune: "A rabid collection of xenophobes and racists who are hostile to immigrants lose no opportunity to argue that migration is bad for indigenous populations" (p. 25). The problem with such name-calling is that it downplays the fact that regardless of how the Northern workers actually feel about immigrants, their economic grievance is real and will not go away. (966)

## Extend: “Claims Ignore Migration Costs”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_ — Claims Ignore Migration Costs. Moving billions of people costs trillions of dollars — that wipes out any economic benefit of the plan. Their studies just imagine that everyone can move cost free, which is absurd. That’s Borjas.

**They say:**

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

### **Migration costs erase benefits from open borders.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

To easily illustrate the attenuating effect of migration costs, suppose that these costs are constant in the working population and equal to  $\pi$  times a worker’s initial salary in the South. Assume further that nonworking dependents tag along with the “householder” and migrate for free. The equilibrium condition that equates the present value of the gains from migration with the costs and that implicitly defines the number of migrants is then given by: (12)  $\alpha N^* (L_N + M^*) \eta - \alpha S (L_S - M^*) \eta = \frac{r}{r + \pi(\alpha S L_S \eta)}$ , where  $r$  is the rate of discount (assumed to be 5 percent).<sup>9</sup> The bottom panel of table 2 reports the results of the simulation assuming that  $\pi = 10$ . Although there are now obviously fewer movers, there are still a lot of them. In the case where there are no spillovers ( $\lambda = 0$ ), the number of movers falls only from 5.6 to 5.3 billion. However, the gains from migration fall substantially because the calculation of the gains must now account for the cost of moving over 5.3 billion people. The annualized global gain—net of migration costs—is defined by: (13)  $\Delta Y' = (\int_0^{L_N+M^*} \alpha N^* L_N dL + \int_0^{L_S-M^*} \alpha S L_S dL - Y_0) - r(\pi \alpha S L_S \eta) M^*$ . Table 2 shows that these net gains fall from \$40 to \$28 trillion when there are no externalities, and from a positive gain of \$9 trillion to a loss of almost a trillion dollars when  $\lambda = 0.5$ . Of course, we have no idea what the costs of migration will actually be if migration restrictions were to be removed and billions of people from poor countries were on the move. The formation of social networks among migrants could substantially lower the costs of migration for the second or third billionth mover. But congestion costs in the receiving countries could also increase exponentially, making it harder to resettle that marginal migrant. Regardless, the global gains from unrestricted

migration need to be contrasted with the costs of moving billions of people if the exercise is to be taken seriously. After all, it seems that migration costs do not need to be all that high to make those trillion-dollar bills disintegrate even faster. (970-1)

**Aff authors ignore migration costs — the plan devastates workers currently in America.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

A second important implication of the model is that there are going to be a lot of migrants. The simulation implies that 2.6 billion workers, or 95 percent of the workforce in the South, will move. If these workers bring along their families, the 95 percent mobility rate implies that nearly 5.6 billion persons would move from the South to the North. It is fair to say that this particular implication of the model has not received nearly the same emphasis or attention as the fact that world GDP would increase by tens of trillions of dollars. For example, the original Hamilton and Whalley (1984) article spends a great deal of time poring over detailed estimates of the dollar gains, but curiously neglects to report the number of movers required to achieve those gains at any point in the study. The glossing-over of this particular implication may be the politically sensible thing to do if one wishes to advocate these types of models in policy circles.<sup>4</sup> However, it is conceptually impossible to buy into the argument that unrestricted immigration will increase world GDP by \$40 trillion without simultaneously buying into the prediction that this will entail the movement of billions of people from the South to the North. These huge flows will necessarily imply a substantial redistribution of wealth, and these distributional consequences also tend to be overlooked. Specifically, the LN native workers in the North will be at the losing end of the deal. After all, “factor price equalization” means precisely that: factor prices are equalized, with initially high-wage workers eventually earning less and initially low-wage workers eventually earning more. As figure 1 shows, the influx of M workers reduces the North’s wage from  $w_N$  to  $w^*$ , and raises the wage of all Southern workers (whether they migrated or not) from  $w_S$  to  $w^*$ . The implied percent wage changes are given by Rows 5 and 6 of table 1 report these predicted wage effects. The earnings of the North’s native workforce fall by almost 40 percent, and the earnings of Southern workers increase by 143 percent.

## **Prefer the most recent evidence — aff claims have been disproven.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Although much of the economic literature on immigration has typically focused on estimating employment and fiscal impacts in specific receiving or sending countries, there has been a parallel tradition that attempts to examine the impact of international migration flows from a global perspective. Beginning with the seminal work of Hamilton and Whalley (1984), a number of studies propose a variety of models that are then calibrated to describe what the economy would look like if sovereign countries surrendered their ability to restrict in- or out-migration flows.<sup>1</sup> One common implication from these simulations is that the global gains from the removal of immigration restrictions would be huge, amounting to trillions of dollars annually. This finding has led to **a popular metaphor that there are “trillion-dollar bills” lying on the sidewalk**, ready for the taking, if only the receiving countries would remove the self-imposed migration barriers. The **two books** that form the basis for this review essay **address** some of **these global issues** from very different perspectives. Paul **Collier’s** Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World **examines whether the available evidence suggests that the unrestricted flows** of labor **will, in fact, generate the sizable gains that are promised by the generic study** in the literature, **while** Martin **Ruhs’s** The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration **shows that practically all receiving countries walk by the trillion-dollar bills** promised by the economic models, **and instead set up a variety of strict and sometimes draconian immigration restrictions. Put together, the two books suggest** (at least to me) **that perhaps it is time for a reappraisal of the economic argument that unrestricted migration would generate huge global gains**. (962)

## Extend: “Causes Institutional Failure”

Extend 1NC # \_\_\_\_ — Causes Institutional Failure. Moving billions of people destroys the economic and social structures that made receiving countries effective in the first place. That’s Borjas.

**They say:**

[Write out what the 2AC said and your answers to it here. Then read more evidence.]

**Mass migration collapses the institutions that are essential for economic growth.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Regardless of these quibbles, Exodus makes an important conceptual contribution by suggesting that because of the misguided emphasis on showing that immigration “is good for everyone,” the literature has too often disregarded inconvenient facts, overlooked the potentially paradigm-changing general equilibrium effects, and proposed the types of political upheavals that many observers would consider to be radical rearrangements of the social order. Because there is no precise modeling and measurement of the various costs and benefits, Collier does not provide a numerical estimate of how much accounting for the general equilibrium concerns would reduce the presumed global gains. In terms of the model presented earlier, it is evident that the problem with doing such a calculation is that we simply do not know what would happen to the shape of the North’s aggregate production function after the influx of billions of persons. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) note, “nations fail” mainly because of differences in political and economic institutions. Analogously, Collier argues: “one reason poor countries are poor is that they are short of effective organization” and “migrants are essentially escaping from countries with dysfunctional social models” (pp. 33–34). For immigration to generate substantial global gains, it must be the case that billions of immigrants can move to the industrialized economies without importing the “bad” organizations, social models, and culture that led to poor economic conditions in the source countries in the first place. It seems inconceivable, however, that the North’s production function remains unchanged after the admission of billions of new workers. Echoing Max Frisch’s observation, Collier bluntly states: “Uncomfortable as it may be . . . migrants bring their culture with them” (p. 68)

**Factoring institutional damage into models makes open borders *net negative* for growth.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Using this approach, **it is straightforward to conduct an alternative simulation** of the model.

**Suppose** again that **migration is costless** so that persons can easily move back and forth between the North and the South until wages are equalized across regions. This equilibrium is characterized by the restriction that:  $(10) \alpha_N * (L_N + M^*) \eta = \alpha_S (L_S - M^*) \eta = 1$ , so that the equilibrium level of migration  $M^*$  takes account of the externalities that the migrants impose on the Northern infrastructure.<sup>6</sup> The gain in world GDP resulting from this set of assumptions is given by:  $(11) \Delta Y^* = \int_0^{L_N+M^*} \alpha_N * L \eta dL + \int_0^{L_S-M^*} \alpha_S L \eta dL - Y_0$ . Row 2 of the top panel of table 2 shows that **if  $\lambda$  were equal to 0.5, the net gain falls from \$40 trillion to \$8.8 trillion.**

**In addition, if  $\lambda$  were equal to 0.75, the net gains become negative because now the entire world’s workforce is largely operating under the inefficient organizations and institutions that were previously isolated in the South but have now spilled over to the North.**

Let me stress that **this is only a simulation**—and one should put as much faith in these numbers as one puts on the promise that trillion-dollar bills lie strewn all over the sidewalk. **The exercise, however, teaches a lesson that has far too often been ignored: the gains from unrestricted immigration depend largely on how the infrastructure in the receiving economies adjusts** to the influx of perhaps billions of persons. Although we have no idea about how this adjustment will pan out, there will be an adjustment. **In fact, even these estimates are probably too optimistic,** because I have assumed that migration is costless. **Migration costs, however, are real, sizable, and will further reduce the global gains.**

Consider, for example, the wage differences between Puerto Rico and the United States. In 2010, the mean annual earnings of a construction worker in his thirties was \$23,000 in Puerto Rico and \$43,000 in the United States.<sup>7</sup> The annual income of a young Puerto Rican construction worker, therefore, would increase by \$20,000 annually if he or she were to migrate, implying a lifetime present value of around \$400,000 (if the rate of discount is 5 percent). A Puerto Rican nonmover— and two-thirds of Puerto Ricans have chosen not to move—is leaving almost a half-million dollar fortune unclaimed. This fact is consistent with the canonical income maximization model of migration only if the costs of migration are at least that high for the many people who choose not to move. **Although this calculation may seem contrived, studies that rely on structural models of labor flows often provide similarly large estimates of**

**migration costs**. Bertoli, Fernández-Huertas, and Ortega (2013, p. 89) calculate that migration costs for the average low-educated Ecuadorian immigrant in the United States are almost **nine times the worker's salary**. Similarly, Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010, p. 1021) estimate average moving costs that are around ten times the annual wage for workers who move from one sector to another in response to trade shocks in specific industries.<sup>8</sup> (968-70)

## Prefer Neg Evidence

**Be skeptical of aff claims — that not a single country has tried this is a reason to prefer the status quo.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Despite this indeterminacy, **Ruhs’s detailed documentation** of the existence and variation in immigration policies **has a crucial implication for the models that predict huge gains from unrestricted migration**. **To put it bluntly, why exactly are the receiving countries being so stupid?** Why do policymakers in these countries not buy into the models and enact policies that would substantially increase national income? Why do countries like Canada and Australia, which offer both very high wages that would keep attracting immigrants and vast geographic regions waiting to be filled, keep strolling on that mythical sidewalk, keep seeing those trillion-dollar bills, and just keep walking right on by? This point can be quantified in the context of the simulation. **Suppose that the capital stock in each region is owned by the capitalists** in that region. **It is then straightforward to calculate the change in the income that accrues to all Northerners** after they pay out the immigrants’ salaries. This quantity is given by: (14)  $\Delta \text{Net Income of North} = \int_0^L \alpha_N \cdot L_N \cdot dL - \int_0^L \alpha_N \cdot L_N \cdot dL - w_N \cdot M^*$ , where  $w_N \cdot M^*$  is the wage paid in the Northern labor market after the relaxation of immigration restrictions.<sup>10</sup> Row 3 of table 2 reports the income change accruing exclusively to Northerners. **If there were no spillovers and if migration were costless, this income would increase by around \$13 trillion** as a result of unrestricted immigration. **It would seem, therefore, that receiving countries have a huge incentive to remove immigration restrictions**; the size of the national economic pie increases and the country could, in theory, redistribute some of its additional wealth so that all natives in the receiving country are better off. **The simulation also shows, however, that the increase in Northern income quickly dissipates and turns negative if there are significant spillovers**. If the parameter  $\lambda = 0.5$ , for example, the \$13 trillion gain turns into a \$2 trillion loss. In short, **the general equilibrium effects can easily turn a receiving country’s expected windfall from unrestricted migration into an economic debacle**.<sup>11</sup> My inference from Ruhs’s The Price of Rights **is that receiving countries endogenously choose those policies that are most beneficial for them**. And **those countries’ revealed preference**—the fact that they repeatedly keep ignoring the advice of the social engineers—**contains valuable information**. **If the trillion-dollar benefits were really there** for the taking, **would not some receiving country have already chosen to go down that path?** **The fact that these countries instead keep enacting immigration restrictions hints at the possibility that perhaps those trillion-dollar bills are not real**. I know that **an easy retort** to this interpretation of the evidence **is that the**

**policymakers and populations of the receiving countries form a “rabid collection of xenophobes and racists.” But another interpretation, which may be just as valid, is that perhaps those policymakers and native populations know something that the social engineers ignore: there are few gains to be had after accounting for the adverse spillovers.**

(971-2)

### **Err on the side of preserving the status quo.**

**Borjas 15** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2015 (“Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, December, Vol. 53, No. 4, Available Online at <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.53.4.961>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

The striking variation in the types of restrictions that different receiving countries impose on specific types of international migrants suggests a promising avenue for research. After all, the variation may provide a great deal of information about how receiving countries perceive and quantify the potential externalities that would arise if the country were hit by very large supply shocks from specific places. These different choices may be amenable to empirical study by carefully examining how the adopted policies reflect preexisting local conditions, including the geographic, economic, religious, linguistic, and historical linkages among the various countries. There is, in fact, a related and underappreciated inference that can be drawn from Ruhs’s exhaustive accounting of immigration restrictions. The **existing research on the economic impact of immigration typically treats the policy parameters that regulate immigration flows into a receiving country as exogenously determined, and then exploits the policy-induced variation in the size and composition of these flows to measure the various economic effects. The observed policy, however, is endogenous. This endogeneity suggests that the effects observed in a particular context may provide little insight into the economic impact that similar supply shocks would have in other places and at other times.** In fact, **it seems likely that a particular policy is chosen because that choice leads to the greatest benefits and/or smallest costs in that place and at that time. The application of that specific policy in any other context would likely lead to a diminution of the benefits and/or an increase in the costs. A little humility about what we actually know would seem to be a prerequisite before anyone proposes a breathtaking rearrangement of the world order.** (972-3)

## They Say: “Borjas is Wrong”

**Their evidence is based on big business think-tank’ing — it’s ideological and not evidence-driven.**

**Ruark 14** — Eric Ruark, MA in European History, Ph.D. candidate at University of Maryland College Park Director of Research, 2014 (“The (Il)logic of Open Border Libertarians,” FAIR: Federation for American Immigration Reform, May 21<sup>st</sup>, Available Online at [http://fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/The\\_%28Il%29Logic\\_of\\_Open\\_Border\\_Libertarians-2.pdf](http://fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/The_%28Il%29Logic_of_Open_Border_Libertarians-2.pdf), Accessed 08-09-2018)

**Big-business interests have a large stake in the outcome of the debate over immigration, and they have spent much money supporting** libertarian “**think-tanks**” **that espouse an open-border policy for the United States**. By all appearances, **this** has very little to do with any principled commitment to libertarian principles, but **is a way to provide ideological cover for multi-national corporations who lobby for the passage of legislation that will undermine the standing of American workers and force taxpayers to subsidize the costs of a cheaper foreign labor force**. An open border, or at least **a more open border, would allow corporations to further consolidate their hold on the U.S. economy, while the middle class would lose more of its economic and political power**.

**Reject evidence that minimizes the link — it’s the result of academic censorship and extreme biases toward portraying immigration as an unmitigated good.**

**Borjas 16** — George Borjas, Professor of Economics and Social Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, recipient of the 2011 IZA Prize in Labor Economics, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia, 2016 (We Wanted Workers: Unraveling the Immigration Narrative, ISBN-13: 978-0393249019)

Times have certainly changed. Immigration has now become perhaps the most divisive political issue of our time. And **immigration research has become a central focus of interest among labor economists** (those of us who specialize in examining how labor markets work). Hundreds of published academic studies examine various aspects of the immigration puzzle. These two threads of interest feed off each other. **As the political debate heated up, there was increasing demand for information** that could be used to frame the discussion and, particularly, **to support specific policy positions. Obviously, where there is demand**—and especially where there are funds for researchers to conduct such studies—**there will be supply, and a rapidly growing number of economists now work on immigration-related issues**. The number of research studies is now so large that it would take a few months of careful reading to become familiar with the various themes. It probably would take even longer to fully appreciate the subtleties built into the theories and statistical methods that are commonly used to frame and answer the questions. Paul Collier, a renowned British public intellectual and a professor at

Oxford University, published a book in 2013 entitled Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World. Collier himself had never conducted research on immigration issues in his academic work; instead, he had written a number of influential books on such diverse topics as the impact of government aid to poor countries and the politics of global warming. The main point of Exodus is that the presumed large benefits that immigration can impart to receiving countries may be greatly reduced as the number of immigrants increases substantially and the migration flow continues indefinitely. Large and persistent flows, Collier argued, could have many other (sometimes harmful) unintended consequences. Regardless of how one feels about this conclusion, I found it particularly insightful to read Collier's overall perception of the many social science studies that he reviewed as he prepared to write the book: **A rabid collection of xenophobes and racists who are hostile to immigrants lose no opportunity to argue that migration is bad for indigenous populations. Understandably, this has triggered a reaction: desperate not to give succor to these groups, social scientists have strained every muscle to show that migration is good for everyone. This is as damning a statement about the value of social science research on immigration as one can find.** As far as I know, Collier is the first distinguished academic to state publicly that **social scientists have attempted to construct an intricate narrative that shows the measured impact of immigration to be "good for everyone."** I have never made such an assertion in public. But I have long suspected that **a lot of the research** (particularly, but not exclusively, outside economics) **was ideologically motivated, and was being censored or filtered to spin the evidence in a way that would exaggerate the benefits from immigration and downplay the costs.**

## They Say: “Consensus of Experts Vote Aff”

No consensus in the field.

**Swanson 16** — Ana Swanson, covers the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for the Washington Post, 2016 (“Opening up borders: An idea economists tend to love and politicians detest,” Washington Post, October 14<sup>th</sup>, Available Online at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.3644dc63446d](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/why-economists-love-and-politicians-detest-the-idea-of-opening-the-borders-to-lots-more-immigrants/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3644dc63446d), Accessed 08-08-2018)

Polls of economists' views reflect this **debate**. In a survey of more than 40 of the nation's most prominent economists, **half** agreed that the average U.S. citizen would be better off if a large number of low-skilled foreign workers were legally allowed to enter the United States each year. **Twenty-eight percent** said they were **uncertain**, and 9 percent **disagreed**. However, they also recognized the costs of such policies. **Nearly half** of the economists also **agreed that**, unless they were compensated by others, many **low-skilled Americans would be worse off**.

# **Brain Drain DA**

## 1NC — Brain Drain DA

The [first/next] off is the Brain Drain DA.

**First, the status quo balances migration and brain gain — it's Goldilocks.**

**Khilji and Schuler 17** — Shaista E. Khilji, Professor of Human and Organizational Learning and International Affairs at GW University, founding editor of the South Asian Journal of Business Studies, worked on President Obama's initiative to develop transparent US government culture, and Randall Schuler, Professor of Strategic International Human Resource Management and Strategic Human Resources Management, former director of the Center for Global Strategic Human Resource Management, Fellow of the American Psychological Association, 2017 ("Talent Management in the Global Context," in The Oxford Handbook of Talent Management, edited by David G. Collings, Kamel Mellahi, and Wayne F. Cascio, ISBN-13: 978-0198758273)

**China**, following in Korean and Taiwanese footsteps, **provides a good example** of a country that **has successfully embarked on** a comprehensive policy of **luring back diasporic persons**. Zweig (2006) traces Chinese interest in diasporas to the 1990s, when **the central government realized** that in order **to improve science and technology** in China, **it had to let people go** abroad freely, **and then compete for them in the international market by creating a domestic environment that would attract them**. Subsequently, the Chinese government improved the environment for immigrants and returnees by developing job introduction centers, offering preferential policies (of giving them more living space and higher professional titles), establishing a national association of returned students, and increasing support for scientific research. Local governments also started competing for talent by instituting their own policies. At the same time, universities and government-funded research organizations also actively started recruiting immigrants and returnees. **Many other countries** in Asia and Eastern Europe **have adopted similar practices to lure back highly skilled persons to support their respective economic development** (Ragazzi, 2005; Tung and Lazarova, 2006). **These programs and incentives have resulted in a reverse brain drain globally**, or what Saxenian refers to as "**brain circulation**" (2005: 36)—that is, the ability of the diasporic and returnees to establish business relationships or to start new businesses while maintaining their social and professional ties elsewhere (countries they graduated from and gained experience in). These **returnees have proven critical to the overall development of talent nationally by transferring their knowledge and experience to the people they work with** (DeVoretz and Zweig, 2008; Kapur and McHale, 2005; Tung and Lazarova, 2006) and **establishing a new form of economic growth model through entrepreneurship and experimentation** (Saxenian, 2005).

## **Second, increasing open migration causes devastating brain drain in developing countries.**

**Brock and Blake 16** — Gillian Brock, Ph.D. Professor of Humanities at Auckland, and Michael Blake, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, 2016 (“Global Justice and the Brain Drain,” Journal Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 9, Issue 1, Available Online at <https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v9.33498>)

Our world is a terribly unequal place. It is unequal in terms of simple dollars and cents: the average citizen of Malawi has an annual income of US\$320, while the average citizen of Japan has an annual income of almost US\$48,000.<sup>1</sup> This sort of inequality has been much discussed in recent political philosophy and theory; theorists have spent a great deal of time trying to understand precisely what sorts of inequality might be regarded as unjust, and why.<sup>2</sup> The world is, however, terribly unequal in other ways, and these ways have not received similar levels of analysis. Consider again Malawi and Japan: Japan has around 21 physicians per 10,000 people, while Malawi has only one physician for every 50,000 people.<sup>3</sup> This radical **inequality in medical skills and talents has**, obviously, **bad consequences for health**; **people born in Malawi will live, on average, 32 years fewer** than their counterparts born in Japan.<sup>4</sup> **These facts** are troubling in themselves. They **become more troubling**, though, **when we start asking why nations like Malawi have so few physicians**. It is not that the citizens of developing countries have no interest in becoming physicians, or entirely lack the opportunity for training. Indeed, **developing societies spend a great deal of money training new physicians** and spots in medical schools are avidly sought. Rather, **the low number of physicians has much to do with what medical training provides\***namely, **the opportunity to leave that developing society, in search of perceived better prospects**. **Developed societies** such as the United States and the United Kingdom **have made immigration comparatively easy for those with scarce medical skills**, and **such citizens often choose to pursue these immigration options**. Consider, for instance, that **in 2000, Ghana trained 250 new nurses\*and lost 500 nurses to emigration**.<sup>5</sup> In 2001, **Zimbabwe graduated 40 pharmacists\*and lost 60**.<sup>6</sup> In 2002 alone, Malawi lost 75 nurses to the United Kingdom\*a cohort that represented 12% of all the nurses resident in Malawi.<sup>7</sup> **The result has been a continued shortage of medical personnel in developing countries**, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, **despite considerable African investment in education**. **This phenomenon of high levels of migration of skilled people from developing nations to developed ones is often referred to as the brain drain**. **Brain drain should be troubling to those who care about global justice**. **The phenomenon seems poised to perpetuate the inequality in life-chances between developing and developed societies**. The **absent talent of the emigrant undermines both the life-chances of present citizens of the developing society\*a society with fewer doctors**, after all, is a society in which more people will die avoidable deaths\*and the chances for that society to develop flourishing institutions for future citizens. The phenomenon is troubling in other ways: **the wealthy citizens of the developed world**, already well-equipped with skilled citizens, **are further increasing their stock by drawing on some of the world’s worst-off societies, thus**

rendering those societies even more badly positioned to address citizens' needs in the future.<sup>8</sup>

**Finally, brain drain turns the case. Elites benefit disproportionately at the expense of the poorest billion. Aff evidence comes from an ideologically flawed data set.**

**Collier 13** — Paul Collier, Ph.D. Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Oxford University, 2013 (“Migration Hurts the Homeland,” New York Times, November 13th, Available Online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/opinion/migration-hurts-the-homeland.html>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

**Migration is good for poor countries, but not in every form, and not in unlimited amounts.**

The migration that research shows is unambiguously beneficial is the kind in which young people travel to democracies like America for higher education and then go home. Not only do these young people bring back valuable skills directly learned in the classroom; they bring back political and social attitudes that they have assimilated from their classmates. Their skills raise the productivity of the unskilled majority', and their attitudes accelerate democratization. For example, global data on students from poor countries who have studied abroad since 1950 shows that those who went to democracies accelerated political liberalization in their home societies out of all proportion to their numbers. Democratization across Latin America, Africa and Asia has been supported by this process. In an opinion article in The Washington Post last spring, Mr. Zuckerberg asked, “Why do we kick out the more than 40 percent of math and science graduate students who are not U.S. citizens after educating them?” My response: Whatever the reason, it is a highly effective way of helping poorer societies. Even what looks like a brain drain can sometimes be beneficial. When educated people emigrate and settle in a richer country', the poorer country' suffers a direct loss; but by demonstrating that the effort to acquire education can end triumphantly', it can encourage many others to pursue an education, too. The brain drain becomes a reality' only' if too many' of the educated leave. But **many poor countries have too much emigration. I do not mean that they would be better with none, but they would be better with less.** The big winners from the emigration of the educated have been China and India. Because each has over a billion people, **proportionately** few people leave. In contrast, **small developing countries** have high emigration rates, even if their economies are doing well: Ghana, for instance, has a rate of skilled emigration **12 times** that of China. **If**, in addition, **their economies are in trouble, they suffer an educational hemorrhage.** **The top rankings for skilled emigration are a roll call of the bottom billion.** Haiti loses around **85 percent of its educated youth**, a rate that is **debilitating.** **Emigrants send money back, but it is palliative rather than transformative.** China and India, with their low rates of emigration and high rates of return, **have dominated global thinking** about how migration affects countries of origin. **But the core development challenge is now whether the poor, small**

**societies can catch up.** Unlike China and India, they have too much emigration. **They can do little about it, but we can do quite a lot: Their emigration rates are set by our immigration policies.** Much of the pressure for more rapid immigration comes from diasporas wanting to bring in dependent relatives. But **bowing to this pressure is not necessarily humane: Bringing relatives to America reduces the incentive to send remittances** back home. Migrant families do well for themselves by **jumping into a chain of lifeboats** headed for the developed world, but this **can be at the expense of the vastly larger group of families left behind.** Seemingly **the most incontestable case for a wider door is to provide a refuge for those fleeing societies in meltdown.** The high-income democracies should indeed provide such a refuge, and this means letting more people in. **But the right to refuge need not imply the right to residency. The people best equipped to flee from societies in meltdown are their elites: The truly poor cannot get farther than a camp over the border. Post-meltdown, the elites are needed back home. Yet if they have acquired permanent residence they are reluctant to return.** For example, **South Sudan, one of the world's poorest countries, is bleeding a remittance outflow:** Government officials told me that key people can be coaxed back only by high salaries, and even then they leave their families abroad and send their Sudanese earnings back to them. **Our priority' should be to design policies of refuge that reconcile our duty' of rescue with the legitimate concerns of post-conflict governments** to attract back the people who could **rebuild their countries.** Emigres face a coordination problem: Going home is much less scary' if others are doing the same. The right to refuge could include sunset rules linked to peace settlements and the monitored efforts of post-conflict governments. **Bright, young, enterprising people are catalysts of economic and political progress. They are like fairy godmothers, providing benefits, whether intended or inadvertent, to the rest of a society".** **Shifting more of the fairy" godmothers from the poorest countries to the richest can be cast in various lights. It appeals to business as a cheap supply of talent. It appeals to economists as efficient,** since the godmothers are indeed more productive in the rich world than the poor. (Unsurprisingly, our abundance of capital and skills raises their productivity.) It appeals to libertarians as freeing human choice from the deadening weight of bureaucratic control. At the more radical end of this spectrum, aficionados of Ayn Rand will see it as the triumphant release of the strong minority" from the clutches of the weak majority" "migrants shrugged." **Many on the left, for their part, don't like to recognize that we're taking away fairy" godmothers. They prefer to believe that they're helping poor people flee difficult situations at home. But we might be feeding a vicious circle, in which home gets worse precisely' because the fairy' godmothers leave. Humanitarians become caught up trying to help individuals, and therefore miss the larger implications:** There are poor people, and there are poor societies. **An open door for the talented would help Facebook's bottom line, but not the bottom billion.**

## They Say: “Brain Circulation Not Drain”

**Educational structure prevents brain circulation — relevant skills aren’t taught.**

**Skolnikoff 93** — Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science at MIT, 1993 (“Knowledge without Borders? Internationalization of the Research Universities,” The American Research University, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall, Available Online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20027206.pdf>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

Brain Drain. As American society and universities became increasingly attractive to citizens of other countries after the war, a steadily growing number of students, especially from developing countries, have come to American universities and have stayed in the country after graduation. The issues associated with this migration of talent or "brain drain" have been a continuing source of controversy because of the effects on the countries from which the individuals came. Some have argued that the universities have a responsibility to ensure that the students return home after graduation, or at least a responsibility to tailor an educational program suitable for the situation of that home country. **Most research universities make little provision for adjusting their educational program to the needs of developing countries. This is especially so in the most popular fields of engineering and science where the quality of the curriculum depends on close interaction with the cutting edge of research, a relationship that cannot be altered by fiat.** In fields in which issues of particular concern to development form important parts of the research agenda, such as urban studies, political science, and civil engineering, relevant courses and research opportunities can be offered. But, in the majority of fields at a research university, the domestic needs of developing countries are not directly addressed. **This increases the likelihood that students from those countries will be dissatisfied if they return home** after completing a degree. In effect, **the advanced curriculum of the research universities is providing an added incentive for those from developing countries to stay in the United States.** But the **students typically come because of that advanced curriculum, and not to learn about their own problems.** Universities cannot be indifferent to the issue, but neither is it their role to restrict admissions, control students after graduation, or compromise their educational objectives because of the possible effects on other countries. It is clear, however, that **this is an important economic and foreign policy issue** for the United States, and a domestic issue for the countries of origin. As mentioned earlier, some countries are making new efforts to create the conditions at home that will lure their former nationals back. This is a sensible step for those countries, for it is only by finding ways to make effective use of the training received in the United States that the economic advantages to the home nation can be realized. **The US government is not an innocent party or indifferent to the brain drain; immigration legislation actually encourages individuals with skills to remain in the United States.** If the brain drain were to dry up, the US economy would suffer unless successful steps had already been taken to increase the supply of American students moving into the fields in which foreign students are making such a large contribution. (247-8)



## **They Say: “Brain Drain Arguments Faulty”**

**Open borders cause brain drain — empirics prove.**

**Obama 16** — Barack Obama, former US president, JD from Harvard, 2016 (“Young Leaders of the Americas Youth Address,” November 20th, Available Online at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamaYLA12016.htm>, Accessed 08-09-2018)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, first of all, I know that your father is very proud that you said he's the smartest man you know. I hope that Malia and Sasha would say the same thing about their father -- I don't know. But I'm sure that made him feel good. Look, **America is a nation of immigrants**. Those of you who visited America, if you walk in an American city -- not just New York or Los Angeles, but St. Louis or Indianapolis or Columbus, Ohio -- if you walk down the street, you see people that look like they could be from anyplace. Because the fact is, is that except for the Native American populations, everybody in America came from someplace else. All of us are immigrants. And that's been our greatest strength, because we've been able to attract talent from everywhere. I use this as an example: You notice that the United States did really well in the Olympics. Now, some of that is because we're a big country, we're a wealthy country, so we have all these training facilities and we can do all kinds of -- best equipment. All that is true. But you know what, China is a bigger country and spends a lot of money also. The big advantage that America has, if you look at our team -- actually, two big advantages. First, we passed something called Title IX many years ago that requires that women get the same opportunities in sports as men do. (Applause.) And that's why -- one of the reasons the American teams did so well is the women were amazing, and just because they've gotten opportunities. Right? Which teaches us something about the need to make sure that women and men, boys and girls, get the same opportunities. Because you do better when everybody has a chance, not just some. But the second thing -- you look at a U.S. Olympic team and there are all kinds of different sorts of people of all different shapes and sizes. And part of it is because we draw from a bigger genetic pool than anybody -- right? We have people who -- these little gymnasts, they're like this big. Simone Biles came by the White House. She's a tiny little thing. Amazing athlete. Then we have Michael Phelps, he's 6'8" and his shoulders are this big. And that's good for swimming. He couldn't do gymnastics, but he's a really good swimmer. The point is, is that when you have all this talent from all these different places, then you actually, as a team, do better. And that's been the great gift of America. Now, **what we have to do** not just **in the United States**, but in all countries, **is to find a way to have a open, smart immigration policy, but it has to be orderly and lawful**. And I think that part of what's happened in the United States is that even though the amount of illegal immigration that is happening has actually gone down while I've been President, the perception is that it has just gone up. Partly this is because it used to be that immigrants primarily stayed in Texas and Arizona and New Mexico, border countries, or in Florida. And now they're moving into parts of the country that aren't used to seeing immigrants, and it makes people concerned -- who are

these people, and are they taking our jobs and are they taking opportunity, and so forth. So my argument has been that **no country can have completely open borders, because if they did, then nationality and citizenship wouldn't mean anything.** And obviously **if we had completely open borders, then you would have tens of millions of people who would suddenly be coming into the United States -- which, by the way, wouldn't necessarily be good for the countries where they leave, because in some places like in Africa, you have doctors and nurses and scientists and engineers who all try to leave, and then you have a brain drain and they're not developing their own countries.** So **you have to have some rules,** but my hope is, is that those rules are set up in a way that continues to invite talented young people to come in and contribute, and to make a good life for themselves. What we also, though, have to do is to invest in countries that are sending migrants so that they can develop themselves. So you mentioned Cuba, for example, where your father fled. He left in part because they didn't feel that there was enough opportunity there. Part of the reason I said let's reopen our diplomatic relations with Cuba is to see if you can start encouraging greater opportunity and freedom in Cuba. Because if you have people who have been able to leave Cuba and do really well in the United States, that means they have enough talent that they should be able to do really well by staying at home in Cuba.

## Impact Outweighs

The plan is exploitative — ethical obligation to protect developing countries from brain drain.

**Delgado and Stefancic 95** — Richard Delgado, JD, Professor of Law at University of Colorado, and Jean Stefancic, JD, Research Associate in Law at University of Colorado, 1995

("Cosmopolitanism Inside Out: International Norms and the Struggle for Civil Rights and Local Justice," Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 27, Spring, Available Online at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2411633](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411633), Accessed 08-09-2018)

**There are** thus many reasons not to apply cosmopolitanism as its latter day advocates urge. Doing so stands to deprive so-called advanced countries of a source of knowledge and experience that they may need. n94 And, as we have pointed out, in narrowing the range of options available, it renders cosmopolitanism of taste and life choice difficult, if not impossible, even for Westerners. n95 Is the recent interpretation of it merely an intriguing "flip," a clever reversal, like political correctness and reverse discrimination, put forward by conservatives who basically do not much care for diversity and rowdy, noisy, clamorous identity politics? n96 We think there is more to it than that, and that the kind of anti-minority, anti-identity sentiment that marches under the cosmopolitanism banner has a thinly veiled power dimension. Consider the timing of the cosmopolitan turn. Many formerly backward nations, which suffered under the yoke of colonialism, are developing [\*786]. They are building industry and beginning to contribute to pollution and the international environmental crisis. At the same time, their populations are booming. Since many of them are still not yet economically self-sufficient nor politically stable, their excess populations are finding their way to economically advanced countries in a wave of immigration, both legal and illegal. n97 If these countries can be persuaded to be "cosmopolitan" and to accept environmental standards dictated by the advanced countries and billed as "the law of nations," their economic development will be slowed but pollution may be abated somewhat. n98 If they can be encouraged to cooperate with immigration controls and standards according to which only urbane, skilled, collegeeducated citizens (not unskilled laborers) will immigrate to the advanced countries, countries in the First World will be better off. Third World countries will be encouraged to forget historic injustices they have suffered and grievances they may justly harbor, and begin doing business with the advanced countries on terms which disrupt these First World countries as little as possible. Developing countries, like minority groups everywhere, need protection first, then the opportunity to assimilate ("mongrelize," as Rushdie puts it) later. Unless this order is followed, cosmopolitanism will be exploitive and one way, as exemplified, for example, by those in the United States who appropriate black music but have little to do otherwise with black culture, n99 or like immigration laws that cause a brain drain from Third World countries because they allow resettlement by surgeons, engineers, and others likely to fit into the professional managerial sectors of the economy. n100

